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Abstract
Consumers seeking to purchase caskets online could benefit from the Supreme Court’s 2005
decision that states cannot discriminate against interstate direct wine shipment. Federal courts
have reached conflicting conclusions when asked whether state laws requiring casket sellers to
be licensed funeral directors violate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. In Powers v.
Harris, the 10th Circuit even offered an unprecedented ruling that economic protectionism is a
legitimate state interest that can justify otherwise unconstitutional policies. In Granholm v.
Heald, however, the Supreme Court declared that discriminatory barriers to interstate wine
shipment must be justified by a legitimate state interest, and states must present real evidence
that the discrimination is necessary to accomplish their policy objectives. The Court conducted a
fact-intensive analysis which concluded the states had failed to make a persuasive case in favor
of discrimination against out-of-state wine sellers. Examining the economic evidence, we find
that state laws which impede electronic commerce in caskets would almost certainly fail a
Granholm
- style factual analysis. This implies that such laws could be held unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause, if a plaintiff brought a challenge similar to the one in Granholm.
Our analysis also suggests that the laws are vulnerable to an Equal Protection or Due Process
challenge if courts consider whether evidence actually supports the state’s defense.
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Introduction
The Internet now affects the market for virtually every good and service imaginable, from cars
and contact lenses to teaching and telemedicine. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Internet is also
affecting the funeral market. Independent vendors often sell caskets online at much lower prices
than funeral homes, which typically mark up their caskets by 300-400%. Many online vendors
also offer a greater variety, such as individualized caskets with western or Victorian themes. One
online vendor features caskets emblazoned with the phrase “Return to Sender.”
Some states, however, have adopted regulations that could limit online casket sales. In
approximately ten states, state law permits retail casket sales only through a vendor who has a
funeral director’s license or operates a physical funeral establishment. These requirements can
impose high costs in both time and money. In South Carolina, for example, a licensee must
complete an apprenticeship that lasts “a minimum of twenty-four months.” Proponents argue that
such regulations protect consumers by preventing high-pressure sales tactics and ensuring proper
burials, while critics counter that such regulations merely protect funeral homes from
competition.
Partly because of their high costs and ambiguous benefits, these types of funeral regulations have
come under legal attack. In three recent cases, federal courts struck regulations pursuant to the
rational basis test after finding that they did not advance any legitimate state interests. A fourth
court upheld similar regulations, despite finding no evidence that the regulations benefited casket
buyers. In a remarkable opinion, the court concluded that economic protectionism for licensed
funeral directors, by itself, qualified as a legitimate state interest.
A recent Supreme Court decision may further alter the analysis of state regulations that impede
e-commerce in favor of local merchants. In Granholm v. Heald, the Court struck down
discriminatory bans against interstate direct shipping of wine, including state laws that required
an out-of-state supplier to maintain an in-state “physical presence” to do business on equal terms
with in-state suppliers. In so holding, the Court recognized that pre-existing state regulations can
impede the flow of e-commerce, and used empirical evidence to evaluate the regulations’ effect
on consumers and state interests. The Court conducted a fact-intensive analysis which concluded
the states had failed to make a persuasive case in favor of discrimination against out-of-state
wine sellers. Although Granholm involved the negative Commerce Clause rather than the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clause, the Court’s rationale ultimately may affect the analysis of
regulations in the funeral industry and other markets affected by e-commerce, including
automobiles, real estate, teaching, and medicine.
Examining the economic evidence, we find that state funeral regulations which impede
electronic commerce in caskets would almost certainly fail a Granholm-style factual analysis.
This implies that such regulations could be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, if
a plaintiff mounts a challenge similar to the one in Granholm. Our analysis also suggests that the
laws are vulnerable to an Equal Protection or Due Process challenge if courts consider whether
evidence actually supports the state’s defense.
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Part I of this Article summarizes the recent cases involving state regulation of casket sales.
Part II explains how Granholm could alter the analysis of these regulations, as well as state
regulations involving e-commerce generally. Part III examines state casket regulations through
the prism of a Granholm analysis, including a discussion of the casket market, the benefit of ecommerce for consumers, and the data regarding consumer welfare and consumer protection.
Part IV concludes.

I.

Recent Funeral Cases

In four recent cases, courts addressed the constitutionality of state casket regulations.2 In each
case, state statutes and regulations limited casket sales to licensed funeral directors, but also
erected significant obstacles to obtaining a license. Typically, the state required a casket vendor
to obtain a “funeral director” and a “funeral establishment” license as a prerequisite to selling
caskets. The plaintiffs—casket vendors and consumers—challenged the statutes on various
constitutional grounds, such as the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. They argued that the licensing requirements were not rationally related to any
legitimate state interest, because the requirements had no rational relation to the business of
selling caskets. The states countered that their laws advanced legitimate consumer protection
goals, such as protecting grieving consumers from overreaching sales tactics and ensuring the
safe disposal of human remains.
All four courts analyzed the regulations under the rational basis test. In three of the cases, out of
Tennessee, Mississippi, and Georgia, the courts struck the statutes. These courts concluded that
the licensing requirements advanced no legitimate state interest, and that in any event, the states
had less restrictive means of achieving their goals. In the fourth case, out of Oklahoma, the court
held that economic protectionism alone qualified as a legitimate state interest for constitutional
purposes.
A. Cases Striking Licensing Requirements
The leading case, Craigmiles v. Giles, involved the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers
Act. The Act forbade anyone from selling caskets unless they obtained a state “funeral director”
license. To obtain a license, an applicant had to complete either (1) one year of study at the only
mortuary school accredited in Tennessee, plus a one-year apprenticeship with an existing funeral
director, or (2) a two-year apprenticeship. After the two years, the applicant then had to pass a
funeral arts test. Most of the applicant’s training, however, had little to do with selling caskets.
Expert witnesses testified that no more than 5% of the mortuary school’s curriculum involved
caskets and urns, and less than 15% of the questions on the funeral test dealt with caskets and
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urns. Much of the remaining coursework dealt with extraneous issues such as embalming or
“restorative art.”3
Nathaniel Craigmiles operated two independent casket stores that sold caskets, urns, flower
holders, and other funeral merchandise. His stores did not embalm bodies or arrange funeral
services. Based on the Tennessee Act, however, the Tennessee Funeral Board issued a cease and
desist order to bar Craigmiles from selling caskets or other merchandise. Represented by the
libertarian public interest group the Institute for Justice, Craigmiles and other plaintiffs sued on
the ground that the statute, as applied to him, violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the 14th Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the case using the rational basis test. Under that test, a regulation is
constitutional if it bears some rational relation to a legitimate state interest. As the court
explained, a statute enjoys a strong presumption of validity, and is valid “if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” To justify such a
statute, the state need not provide “an exquisite evidentiary record” but only “rational speculation
linking the regulation to a legitimate purpose, even unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”
The court stated, however, that “Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”4
Turning to Tennessee’s Act, the court found that the law was “nothing more than an attempt to
prevent economic competition.” In the first place, the court found that the statute did not promote
public health and safety. The plaintiffs did not embalm or otherwise handle the bodies. The court
stated that, in theory, low quality caskets could potentially threaten public health if they leaked,
but the court noted that the Act imposed no safety standards on caskets; the Act did not require
that consumers use any particular type of casket or, indeed, any casket at all. Moreover, the Act
had the practical result of increasing casket prices, which likely led consumers to buy relatively
less protective caskets. For similar reasons, the court also discounted the state’s consumer
protection rationale. Addressing concerns about fraud, the court held that the Act’s licensing
requirement was overbroad because general consumer protection laws already applied to
retailers, and the state could always apply more stringent laws to retailers without requiring
licensing. In any event, consumers would still have to consult a licensed funeral director for
arranging services and handling the body.5
After disposing of the Act’s proffered rationales, the court concluded that Tennessee’s actions
were simply “naked attempts to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral
directors extract from consumers.” The court found that “[t]he licensure requirement imposes a
significant barrier to competition in the casket market” by “protecting licensed funeral directors
from competition on caskets.” As the court explained, “dedicating two years and thousands of
dollars to the education and training required for licensure is undoubtedly a significant barrier to
3
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entering the Tennessee casket markets.” These entry barriers led to higher prices for consumers.
As the court found, “funeral home operators generally mark up the price of caskets 250 to 600%,
whereas casket retailers sell caskets at much smaller margins.”6
Courts used similar reasoning to invalidate funeral regulations in Georgia and Mississippi. In
Peachtree Caskets Direct, Inc. v. State Board of Funeral Service of Georgia, a district court
enjoined enforcement of Georgia’s licensing scheme because “neither the statute nor any rules of
the [Board] contain standards for the design, construction, or sale of caskets or alternative
containers.”7 Similarly, in Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, the district court acknowledged that
the state had a legitimate interest in the prompt disposition of human remains and consumer
protection, but held that the state’s licensing scheme bore no rational relationship to those
purposes. For example, Mississippi “failed to show that the licensing requirement in any way
speeds the process of burial . . . [or] to provide any evidence that unlicensed dealers slow burial
or cremation.”8 In addition, although Mississippi had expressed concern about vendors soliciting
dead bodies, its license requirement did not prevent licensees from soliciting casket sales. As a
result, the court concluded that Mississippi’s law protected funeral homes at the expense of
consumers: “As a result of this [licensing] requirement, consumers in Mississippi are offered
fewer choices when it comes to selecting a casket. Consequently, there is less price competition
among the sellers of caskets. Ultimately, the consumer is harmed by this regulation as one is
forced to pay higher prices in a far less competitive environment.”9
In addition to these court cases, an opinion from the Texas Attorney General similarly concluded
that, under Texas law, the state should allow vendors to sell caskets without a license. As the
Attorney General explained, “while a casket indeed constitutes funeral merchandise, the simple
sale of a casket, without more, is not an act of funeral directing and accordingly does not violate”
Texas law.10 The opinion noted that the “sale does not directly involve the disposition of a body,”
and that “what distinguishes a funeral director is ‘the duty . . . to take charge of,’ and prepare for
burial or other disposition, a dead human body.”11
B. Cases Upholding Licensing Requirements
In contrast to these decisions, the Tenth Circuit recently held that licensing requirements do, in
fact, further a legitimate state interest—economic protectionism. In Powers v. Harris,12 the court
considered Oklahoma’s Funeral Services Licensing Act, which required that anyone engaged in
the sale of funeral merchandise, including caskets, have a funeral director’s license and operate
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out of a licensed funeral establishment. To obtain a license, a candidate must, among other
things, graduate from an accredited program of mortuary science, complete sixty college
semester hours at an accredited institution of higher education, pass two exams, and complete a
one-year apprenticeship in a funeral home, “during which the applicant must embalm 25 bodies.”
Under the Act, a “funeral establishment” must have a fixed physical location, preparation room
for embalming bodies, merchandise-selection room with at least five caskets, and adequate space
for public viewing of human remains.13 The Act extends to intrastate sales only. Out-of-state
vendors can sell caskets directly to Oklahoma consumers, and Oklahoma vendors can sell
caskets to out-of-state consumers.
The plaintiff, an online casket vender based in Oklahoma, charged that the Act bore no rational
relation to Oklahoma’s proffered rationale of protecting consumers. Like the plaintiffs in
Craigmiles, the plaintiffs pointed out that less than 5% of the education and training
requirements related directly to selling caskets. Oklahoma, like Tennessee, countered that the
regulations were not “wholly irrelevant” to the state’s interests because some funeral consumers
may be vulnerable to overreaching sales tactics. Oklahoma also argued that the state deserved
“leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.”14
Unlike Craigmiles, however, the Powers court ignored the question of whether the state’s
statutes actually served the interests of consumers. Instead, the court stated that it was “obliged
to consider every plausible legitimate state interest that might support the [Act]—not just the
consumer-protection interest forwarded by the parties.”15 Accordingly, the court proceeded
directly to consider “whether protecting the intrastate funeral industry, absent a violation of a
specific constitutional provision or a valid federal statute, constitutes a legitimate state interest.”16
In a decision that embodies the worst fears of Mancur Olson’s The Rise and Decline of Nations,
the court held that the naked protectionism qualifies as a legitimate state interest. “[T]he
Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or favoring one particular intrastate industry,
absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory violation, is a legitimate state interest.”17 As
the court explained, “dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains
the favored pastime of state and local governments.”18 Therefore, “in practical terms, we would
paralyze state governments if we undertook a probing review of each of their actions.”19 To strike
Oklahoma’s protectionist scheme for funeral homes would have the effect of threatening
licensing schemes for all professionals, including doctors, electricians, or plumbers.20 Faced with
the prospect of unlicensed accountants or even lawyers, the court upheld the Act’s
13

Id. at 1213.

14

Id. at 1216 (citation omitted).

15

Id. at 1217.

16

Id. at 1218.

17

Id. at 1220.

18

Id. at 1221.

19

Id. at 1218.

20

Id. at 1222.

6

constitutionality because “[t]here can be no serious dispute that the [Act] is ‘very well tailored’
to protecting the intrastate funeral-home industry.”21
The court criticized Craigmiles for relying on cases involving interstate, not intrastate,
commerce. “Our country’s constitutionally enshrined policy favoring a national marketplace is
simply irrelevant as to whether a state may legitimately protect one intrastate industry as against
another when the challenge to the statute is purely one of equal protection.”22 The court also
criticized Craigmiles for examining the motives of the state’s legislature, rather than considering
every conceivable rationale for the state’s actions.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tymkovich criticized the majority for adopting an “unconstrained
view of economic protectionism as a ‘legitimate state interest.’”23 According to him, the majority
had created “an almost per se rule upholding intrastate protectionist legislation.” In Judge
Tymkovich’s view, in contrast, courts should uphold a protectionist effect only where “the
discriminatory legislation arguably advances either the general welfare or a public interest.”24
Although conceding that “[c]onsumer interests appear to be harmed rather than protected by the
limitation of choice and price encouraged by the licensing restrictions on intrastate casket
sales,”25 Judge Tymkovich nevertheless found that Oklahoma had demonstrated its legitimate
interest in promoting the general welfare by bringing enforcement actions under the Act against
funeral directors.
Aside from Powers, one other recent decision held that states have a legitimate, non -protectionist
rationale in requiring a license to sell a casket. In South Carolina, a state administrative law
judge enjoined a stand-alone casket store from selling caskets because the store did not have a
license as a “funeral establishment.”26 The administrative court held that the state had a
“legitimate interest” in requiring licenses for casket vendors because a casket “directly impacts
sanitation.”27 Finally, in 1998, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals upheld the state’s casket
sales restriction based on health and sanitation concerns.28
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II.

Judicial Tests Assessing Regulatory Barriers

Based on the great weight of authority, states lack a rational basis in applying funeral director
and funeral establishment licensing schemes to online casket sales. Other than Powers, the case
law provides no support for the idea that intrastate protectionism, by itself, qualifies as a
legitimate state interest. Moreover, a recent Supreme Court decision may lead courts to more
closely scrutinize state licensing schemes that impair the flow of e-commerce, particularly where
empirical evidence shows that the licensing scheme harms, rather than helps, consumer welfare.
A. Protectionism and Rational Bases
In all four of the recent casket cases, plaintiffs primarily argued that the statutes violated the
Equal Protection, Due Process, or Privileges or Immunities Clauses. The plaintiffs did not
(seriously) allege that the statutes discriminated against out-of-state competitors in violation of
the Commerce Clause, or that the statutes discriminated against, for example, a discrete and
insular minority. In Powers, the plaintiffs had argued that Oklahoma’s statutes violated the
Commerce Clause before the district court; the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate this claim because Oklahoma had never enforced its statutes against out-of-state
vendors, and the plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling. Accordingly, all four cases analyzed the
state statutes using the deferential rational basis test. Under that test, a regulation is constitutional
“if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.”29 Courts
do not require states to provide an “exquisite evidentiary record” to justify their legislative
purposes, so long as the purposes are legitimate.
Aside from Powers, no court decision—and certainly no Supreme Court decision—has ever held
that protectionism, by itself, qualifies as a legitimate state interest.30 For example, the Powers
majority cites Williamson v. Lee Optical31 for the proposition that a state may legitimately try to
free a profession “from all taints of commercialism.” The majority also cites two tax cases in
which states taxed different types of property at different rates, and one case in which New
Orleans created a grandfather exception for longtime vendors of pushcart foodstuffs. Although
all of these cited decisions allowed governments to discriminate in favor of certain economic
interests, none of them supports the majority’s sweeping proclamation.
As the Powers concurrence explained, in all of those cases “the discriminatory legislation
arguably advances either the general welfare or a public interest.”32 In Williamson, for example,
the Supreme Court invoked consumer safety and health interests to uphold the state’s regulation
of eye care. Likewise, in the other cases, the Court invariably upheld the legislation, at least in
part, because the legislation promoted the public good. In both the pushcart and tax cases, the
Court stressed the need to preserve legitimate reliance interests or promote general economic
29
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prosperity.33 As these decisions illustrate, the Constitution may let the government play favorites,
but only if the government does so, at least in part, for the good of the game.34
B. Granholm
Indeed, a 2005 Supreme Court decision, Granholm v. Heald, may lead courts to more closely
scrutinize state regulation that impairs the flow of e-commerce in order to benefit local economic
interests. In Granholm, the Court considered statutory schemes in New York and Michigan that
allowed in-state vendors, but not out-of-state vendors, to ship wine directly to consumers. As the
Court recognized, “[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single largest
regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine.”35 The Court also recognized that the bans
had the effect of protecting intrastate wineries and wholesalers from competition. Because the
plaintiffs alleged that the statutes discriminated against interstate commerce, the Court analyzed
the statutes under the rubric of the negative, or “dormant,” Commerce Clause. The Court
ultimately held that the statutes violated the Commerce Clause by giving in-state vendors an
advantage over out-of-state competitors, and that the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed
Prohibition, did not authorize the discriminatory treatment.
In analyzing the statutes under the Commerce Clause, the Court applied a different framework
than that used to analyze purely intrastate statutes under the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses. Instead of deferring to the state legislature and requiring only “rational speculation” to
uphold the legislation, the Court demanded evidence. “Our Commerce Clause cases demand
more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods. The burden is
on the State to show that the discrimination is demonstrably justified.”36 The Court holds
discriminatory statutes to a higher standard for several reasons. For example, from a public
choice standpoint, more rigorous scrutiny makes sense because out-of-state residents may lack
the ability to defend their interests in another state’s legislature.37
33
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More importantly for the judiciary, a central purpose of the Constitution is to protect the free
flow of goods among the states. “If there was any one object riding over every other in the
adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free
from all invidious and partial restraints.”38 The Founders believed that “to succeed, the new
Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”39
The Commerce Clause enshrines the Founders’ purpose by prohibiting protectionist state
regulation. Although the Clause’s text grants affirmative power to Congress, “It has long been
accepted that the Commerce Clause . . . directly limits the power of the States to discriminate
against interstate commerce. This ‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors.”40 In stressing this aspect of the Commerce Clause, James
Madison wrote that it “grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the
non-importing, and was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among
the States themselves.”41
Although Granholm analyzed the wine statutes using a different, more rigorous test than that
used to analyze the casket statutes, Granholm’s analysis ultimately may affect the way in which
courts analyze any licensing scheme that impairs the flow of e-commerce.
First, and perhaps most importantly, Granholm recognized that e-commerce benefits consumers
and that pre-existing state regulatory schemes can prevent new entrants from competing via the
Internet. The Court noted, for example, that “[wholesaler consolidation] has led many small
wineries to rely on direct shipping to reach new markets. Technological improvements, in
particular the ability of wineries to sell wine over the Internet, have helped make direct
shipments an attractive sales channel.”42 The Court also recognized that a state ban on direct
shipping “substantially limits the direct sale of wine to consumers, an otherwise emerging and
significant business,” even though the “wine producers in the cases before us are small wineries
that rely on direct consumer sales as an important part of their businesses.”43 Indeed, without
direct shipping, many smaller wineries would find distribution “economically infeasible.”44
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Having acknowledged the importance of e-commerce to both consumers and some producers,
the Court may become more willing to force states to articulate plausible reasons for restricting
e-commerce, even for regulations that ostensibly apply only to intrastate transactions. In
particular, Granholm may serve as a template for the types of empirical evidence that courts will
consider, and perhaps require, in the course of evaluating licensing schemes that affect ecommerce under the rational basis test.45 For example, New York and Michigan had argued that
interstate direct shipping allowed minors to buy wine online, and had provided some anecdotal
evidence in support. In finding these assertions “unsupported,” the Court relied heavily on a
study of the wine industry by the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC’s Wine Report canvassed
over a dozen states that permitted interstate direct shipping and found that none of them had
reported any problems with direct sales of wine to minors.46 The Wine Report also relied on
other surveys and basic economic principles to conclude that minors were more interested in beer
and spirits, rather than wine, and that minors had far more direct means of obtaining alcohol than
the Internet. In effect, the Wine Report undermined all of the states’ speculative, nonprotectionist arguments against direct shipping. The Court’s complete embrace of the Wine
Report and scepticism of the states’ arguments suggests that, in the future, the Court may be
amenable to using such evidence to evaluate state laws under the more lenient rational basis test.
Moreover, Granholm also may increase the burden on states to justify treating in-state and outof-state vendors differently. The Court found that, even if direct shipping increased underage
drinking, the states could not justify banning interstate direct shipping while allowing intrastate
direct shipping. As the Court noted, “minors are just as likely to order wine from in-state
producers as from out-of-state ones.”47 Arguably, this rationale also could apply on sales of
online caskets. In Powers, Oklahoma banned intrastate unlicensed vendors from selling caskets
directly to Oklahoma consumers, but never tried to prohibit out-of-state unlicensed vendors from
selling caskets directly to Oklahoma consumers. The record contained no evidence of any
problems with any sales from out-of-state vendors. Based on Granholm, a court could well find
that the lack of a problem from out-of-state vendors thoroughly undermines the plausibility of a
state’s need to limit intrastate sales, even under the rational basis test. In the Internet world, all
commerce is, in a sense, interstate commerce.
In fact, courts could well decide that all e-commerce is “interstate commerce” for constitutional
purposes. In the first place, some of the physical peculiarities of Internet casket sales often
necessitate interstate commerce. Some Internet casket sellers develop networks of bricks-andmortar funeral homes that handle deliveries. In any given transaction, the funeral home handling
the delivery often may ship the casket to a local market far from its physical location—in many
cases, far enough to cross state lines. One of Funeral Depot’s funeral home partners, for
example, will deliver only outside of its local market.48 In addition, the states typically do not
45

See Granholm at *20.

46

See id.; Wine Report.

47

Id. at *20.

48

David E. Harrington, Brick-and-Mortar Barriers to Internet Casket Sales: Are State Funeral Regulations Part of
the Mortar?, Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association (November 19, 2005) (manuscript on file with
authors).

11

limit their statutes and regulations solely to intrastate sales. In Powers, the district court held that
it lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the Commerce Clause claim because Oklahoma had not
enforced its regulatory scheme against out-of-state vendors. In another case, however, perhaps a
declaratory judgment suit, a court could find that the risk of such enforcement could “chill”
interstate sales enough to raise a Commerce Clause issue.
Finally, Granholm may force states to consider less restrictive regulatory alternatives if the states
attempt to limit e-commerce with onerous licensing schemes.49 “[I]mprovements in technology
have eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries. Background checks can be done
electronically. Financial records and sales data can be mailed, faxed, or submitted via e-mail.”50
As the court explained in Craigmiles, the existence of less restrictive, pro-competitive
alternatives increases the burden on the state to justify more onerous rules.51 This analysis
ultimately could affect state regulation of a number of industries, such as automobiles (where
most states prohibit manufacturers from selling new cars directly to consumers and instead
require them to sell through a licensed car dealer), real estate (where many states require dealers
to obtain a license), teaching, or telemedicine.52

III.

Casket Markets and Regulation

A Granholm-type analysis thoroughly undercuts the rationale for requiring casket vendors to
obtain a funeral director’s license or open a physical funeral establishment. The empirical
evidence shows that, as applied to online casket sales, such regulations merely raise prices and
limit competition.
A. The Overall Casket Market
The funeral industry represents a prime target for further e-commerce litigation. Consumers
spend approximately $11 billion on cremations, funerals, and funeral-related expenses annually,
to take care of the roughly 2.4 million Americans who die every year. They thus pay roughly
$4522 per death, making funerals one of the largest-ticket consumer purchases.53 There are
three major casket manufacturers: Batesville Casket, York Group, and Aurora Casket. Batesville
Casket had $510 million in sales in 2002, while both York Group and Aurora Casket have annual
sales of approximately $130 million.54 The leading manufacturers sell their caskets to funeral
homes, who in turn sell most of the caskets to consumers. Three large funeral home chains,
49

See id. at *21.

50

Id.

51

Craigmiles at ___.

52

See FTC workshop.

53

Judith Chevalier and Fiona Scott Morton, National Bureau of Economic Research, State Casket Sales
Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking? 1 (2006)..
54

Hoover’s Company Profiles, Hillenbrand Indus., Inc. (Dec. 3, 2003); Matthews Int’l Names Jonathan H. Maurer
President of York Casket, PR Newswire, Apr. 9, 2002.

12

Service Corp. International (SCI), the Alderwoods Group, and Stewart Enterprises, collectively
own about one-fifth of the nation’s 23,000 funeral homes and handle about one-fifth of the
funerals.55
The large funeral home chains have not developed a substantial online presence, and nearly 70%
of funeral homes nationwide have yet to establish a Web site.56 Of those sites that do exist, “the
vast majority of funeral home Web sites are little more than marketing tools.”57 Unlike in some
other industries, the leading manufacturers do not sell and are not seeking to sell their products
directly to consumers via the Internet, although at least one smaller manufacturer, Casket Royale,
Inc. does ship caskets directly to consumers, as well as to retailers.58 Rather, most online casket
sales come from independent casket vendors or individual funeral homes that have an online
presence.59
Online sales are a small,60 but seemingly growing part of the casket market. Although there are
no hard data,61 as of 2001, online casket sales represented only about 1% of all casket sales.62 In a
2004 survey of funeral homes, however, 56% of respondents identified Internet sellers as a
significant source of competition for casket sales.63 In California, independent vendors estimate
that they now may have about 3% of the casket market in some cities,64 and a funeral industry
web developer reports that 10% of its clients sold funeral services online in 2003, up from 3% in
2001.65 Similarly, “funeral industry executives and analysts say that consumers are increasingly
interested in being able to shop online for their funeral needs.”66
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B. Casket Sale Regulations
State regulation of Internet casket sales varies widely. It appears that no state has enacted
specific statutes or regulations for online sales. Instead, if the state regulates online sales, the
state regulates online vendors by applying existing regulations designed for bricks-and-mortar,
third-party vendors.67 Iowa, for example, regulates pre-need casket sales from third-party
vendors, and applies the same regulations to Internet sales.68 Overall, only a handful of states
have regulations that apply to online casket sales. According to a Government Accountability
Office survey, only sixteen states regulate third-party sales of funeral goods, and only ten states
regulate all third-party sales of funeral goods.69 In most states, therefore, funeral regulations do
not appear to limit Internet casket sales.70
1. Explicit licensing requirements
In the approximately ten states that regulate all third-party sales, statutes restrict the sale of
caskets in the state exclusively to licensed funeral directors.71 Typically, these states require a
license for anyone engaged in funeral directing, and then define the practice of funeral directing
to include the sale of funeral-related merchandise, including caskets. For example, Louisiana
defines “funeral directing” as “the operation of a funeral home, or . . . any service whatsoever
connected with the management of funerals, or . . . the purchase of caskets or other funeral
rate tells the story of how American funeral service has changed”); Sylvester Brown Jr., Poker Amid Ashes?
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merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof . . . .”72 Similarly, Delaware’s statute states that
“no person shall engage in the practice of funeral services . . . unless such person has been duly
licensed,” and then defines “funeral services” as “those services rendered for the . . . burial,
entombment or cremation of human remains, including the sale of those goods and services usual
to arranging and directing funeral services.”73 On its face, therefore, Delaware’s statute appears
to prohibit third-party casket sales.
State licensing requirements can significantly raise the cost of entering the casket market.74
Oklahoma’s regulations require, among other things, that an individual graduate from an
accredited program of mortuary science, complete sixty college semester hours at an accredited
institution of higher education, pass two exams, and complete an embalmer or funeral director
apprenticeship, “during which the applicant must embalm 25 bodies.”75 Such requirements
consume time and money. In South Carolina, a licensee must complete an apprenticeship that
lasts “a minimum of twenty-four months.”76 In Oklahoma, an applicant must complete at least 60
credit hours at an accredited college or university, graduate from an accredited program of
mortuary science, and complete a one-year apprenticeship in a funeral home during which he or
she must embalm at least twenty-five human bodies.77 Other states require that a funeral director
have training in embalming, a specialty that has little relation to the business of selling a casket.
In addition to requiring a funeral director’s license for selling a casket, some states also require
that a casket seller operate out of a licensed “funeral establishment.” “Funeral establishments”
must have particular features. Louisiana, for instance, prohibits anyone from engaging in the
business of funeral directing “unless such business is conducted by a duly licensed funeral
establishment.”78 An “establishment,” in turn, must have “adequate parlors or chapel,” a “display
room,” and an “embalming room,” among other features.79 South Carolina requires that every
funeral establishment have all of the aforementioned features, as well as “at least one motor
hearse for transporting casketed remains.”80
Although some online vendors may also choose to operate bricks-and-mortar retail stores, an
online vendor does not need any of these features to deliver a casket to a consumer. An Internet
vendor need not maintain a chapel or display room because the consumer does not need to
physically visit an online vendor at all. In addition, independent retailers never handle the body,
and therefore do not need embalming facilities. Funeral establishment requirements, therefore,
merely add to the costs of operating online. In Powers, the district court found that, when
combined with the facility and equipment requirements, the funeral establishment license
72
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requirement “effectively precludes the in-state sale of caskets using the Internet model in which
transactions occur by computer or by telephone.”81
It is unclear how much these regulations limit competition in practice. Some evidence suggests
that states are not enforcing these requirements against online vendors, or at least against out-ofstate online vendors. Oklahoma’s funeral board does not regulate, investigate, or restrict the sale
of caskets by persons or businesses located outside the state to consumers inside the state.82 The
National Funeral Directors Association (“NFDA”) testified in 2002 that it “has no knowledge of
any state action against an out-of-state casket retailer offering to sell caskets via the Internet.
Therefore, online casket retailers are currently able to freely sell caskets throughout the United
States.”83 Moreover, several online casket retailers have told the FTC staff that they ship to all
fifty states.84 Caskets are also sold on eBay.
On the other hand, the National Casket Retailers Association, citing a Louisiana case, disagrees
that retailers are able to sell caskets freely in all states.85 Moreover, according to a Maryland
regulator, Washington state permits only licensed funeral service providers to sell pre-need
caskets, which “sort of shuts out the Internet provider of caskets, pre-need or otherwise.”86
Finally, in both Oklahoma and South Carolina, recent litigation suggests that some states are
limiting the sales of third-party vendors. In Powers v. Harris, the district court found that the
plaintiff-casket vendors “have a reasonable and genuine fear that if they were to sell caskets to
Oklahoma consumers, they might be prosecuted . . . . For fear of prosecution, plaintiffs have
foregone in-state casket sales.”87
In states that apply such licensing requirements to casket sales, the requirements likely deter
some independent vendors from selling caskets.88 Online vendors may be unwilling or unable to
incur the costs of obtaining a license. Unlike traditional funeral homes, they may not recover the
full financial costs of obtaining a license, because their business model involves only selling
caskets, not providing services such as embalming.89 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “dedicating two
years and thousands of dollars to the education and training required for licensure is undoubtedly
a significant barrier to entering the Tennessee casket market.”90 Similarly, in Powers, the district
court found that the state’s licensing requirements “effectively preclude” in-state online vendors
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from obtaining a funeral director’s license and, therefore, “from selling caskets to in-state
purchasers.”91
Finally, state licensing requirements could, in theory, prevent out-of-state online vendors from
selling caskets to consumers within the state. In one case, Mississippi’s State Board of Funeral
Services sent a cease and desist order to Casket Royale, a New Hampshire manufacturer, because
neither Casket Royale nor its Mississippi-based dealers had Mississippi licenses.92 Accordingly,
state regulations could threaten one of the Internet’s primary benefits, the ability of online
vendors to provide goods and services to consumers across the country.
2. Indirect effects of licensing
Even if states allow unlicensed, independent vendors to sell caskets, state funeral director
licensing could still discourage independent casket sales by reducing competition in a
“downstream” market, the funeral directors who put the bodies into the caskets. Stringent
licensing requirements, particularly the funeral establishment and embalming regulations, raise
the cost of becoming a funeral director. Increased costs translate into less entry of new funeral
directors. Over time, this reduced entry may result in fewer funeral directors or more cartel
behavior. Online sellers, therefore, may face greater challenges in recruiting bricks-and-mortar
funeral home partners to deliver caskets. Alternately, funeral directors, protected by higher
barriers to entry, may feel freer to disparage online sellers.93
These indirect effects may compound the impact of explicit requirements that all casket sellers
have funeral director’s licenses. Where casket sellers must have a license and that license is
expensive to obtain, the licensing requirement might keep independent casket sellers out of the
market altogether. On the other hand, where casket sellers must have a license but entry into the
funeral directing market is easy, the licensing requirement may have little or no effect.94 Many
of the states that require casket sellers to have funeral director’s licenses also impose costly
licensing requirements on funeral directors, such as lengthy educational and/or apprenticeship
requirements, and the mastery of irrelevant knowledge and skills, such as embalming bodies.
Accordingly, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of the two types of regulation.95
A recent econometric study finds that embalming regulations impede online casket sales.
Adjusting for population size and other demographics, an online seller’s sales are lower than
expected in states that require that all funeral service providers must be embalmers or all funeral
homes must have an embalming preparation room. These regulations reduce the probability of
online casket sales in a zip code by about 25%, although the reduction is smaller in states that
91

Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *6 .

92

Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 435.

93

Harrington, supra note ___, at 11.

94

Daniel Sutter, State Funeral Regulations, Casket Retailers and the Casket Market (June 2003) (working paper at
14, on file with the authors).

95

Harrington, supra note ___, at 15.

17

allow only funeral directors to sell caskets. Since 13 of the 14 states that limit who can sell
caskets also impose stringent embalming requirements, the most one can say is that the licensing
requirement increases online casket sales in states that have high barriers to entry into funeral
directing.96 This may occur because higher entry barriers lead to higher casket prices at funeral
homes, thus increasing demand for cheaper online caskets.
C. Applying the Tests to Funeral Regulation
The empirical evidence undermines claims that licensing restrictions, as applied to online sales
of caskets, serve a legitimate, non-protectionist state interest. Internet sales offer several benefits
to consumers, including convenience and lower casket prices. The consumer protection concerns,
in contrast, are largely illusory.
1. Licensing, E-Commerce, and Consumer Welfare
Regulations that hamper online casket sales could affect consumer welfare in several ways. They
could affect casket prices, funeral prices, and the variety of caskets available to consumers. In
addition, regulation could prevent consumers from enjoying the convenience of searching for
caskets at all hours from the comfort of their homes.
a. Casket Prices
Funerals and caskets are expensive, and are becoming more so. A traditional funeral costs more
than $5,000. A casket, typically the most expensive component of a traditional funeral,97 usually
costs between $2,000-3,000,98 and some mahogany or metal caskets cost as much as $10,000.
Funeral costs have risen substantially over time. From 1981 to 2001, average funeral costs
increased from $2,086 to $5,047, a 142% increase in nominal prices. During that same time
period general consumer prices rose only 94.8%.99
i. Economic Hypotheses
For several reasons, online purchases might lead to lower casket prices for at least some
consumers. The simplest reason is that online shopping allows consumers to conveniently
compare many more sellers’ prices, thus raising the odds that the online shopper will find a
lower price than at a small number of local sellers.100 E-commerce could also lead to generally
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lower retail margins and prices online by reducing the cost of searching price and nonprice
attributes. Online casket sellers might also charge lower prices than offline sellers if state funeral
director licensing creates market power by erecting barriers to entry and lowering the costs of
enforcing casket cartels.101 Finally, an Internet casket retailer may simply have a fundamentally
different business model that incurs less of the traditional retail costs, such as physical
showrooms and sales staff. Each of these factors could lead to lower online prices.102 If bricksand-mortar casket sellers perceive online sales as a substantial competitive threat, they may
respond with lower prices.
A growing body of empirical research finds that e-commerce often offers lower prices and
sometimes reduces prices charged by bricks-and-mortar sellers as well. In auto retailing, for
example, users pay lower prices by using a referral site (autobytel.com) that facilitates price
competition among dealers.103 Similarly, one study found that online book and compact disk
(CD) prices were 9-16% lower than those in bricks-and-mortar stores, even after including
shipping costs and sales taxes.104 Another study found that wine consumers could find lower
prices online (even including shipping costs) than in northern Virginia stores for a sample of
popular wines retailing for more than $20 per bottle.105 By 2004, legalization of interstate directto-consumer wine shipping in Virginia had reduced the online vs. bricks-and-mortar price
difference by 40%.106 Contact lenses purchased online cost less on average than lenses purchased
from bricks-and-mortar sellers, although warehouse clubs offer the lowest prices of all.107
Finally, web sites that facilitate price comparisons for term life insurance policies have lowered
premiums for policies sold offline by 8-15%.108
As a matter of economic theory, however, online sales need not lead to lower prices. The
literature on e-commerce offers two hypotheses suggesting why online prices could be higher
than offline prices: the value of consumers’ time, and reduced search costs for quality attributes.
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If Internet casket sellers are not the lowest-cost suppliers, they may charge a higher price and
survive because their customers find the convenience worth the extra cost.109 Alternately, by
reducing the cost of obtaining information on quality attributes, online sales could increase
customers’ ability to perceive quality differences between different types of caskets, and online
sellers could charge higher prices that reflect these perceived differences.110 In both instances, the
higher online prices need not reduce consumer welfare, because consumers would pay the higher
prices only if they perceived greater value.
Some empirical studies have found that online prices are higher than offline prices. Studies of
online auto auctions, CDs, books, and software have found that prices are higher online.111 Wines
retailing for less than $20 cost more online than in bricks-and-mortar stores, once shipping costs
are included in the online price.112 The book and CD studies, however, occurred relatively early
in the history of e-commerce; more recent studies suggest online prices are lower. The wine
result is explained by shipping costs, since wine is relatively heavy and expensive to ship.
Although economic theory suggests that online prices could be higher or lower than offline
prices, the bulk of the evidence suggests that they are often lower.
There is, finally, one circumstance in which lower online prices might actually lead offline prices
to be higher than they would otherwise be. When retailers face consumers with different price
elasticities of demand, they will charge different prices in equilibrium.113 In states where online
casket sales are legal, the market might actually be segmented into offline and online
components. Funeral directors and other offline merchants, knowing that the majority of their
consumers are less price sensitive than the typical online consumer, might be able to exploit this
differential by raising prices. In this case, the net effect of online casket sales on average casket
prices may be ambiguous.
This proposition has been less frequently tested in the e-commerce literature. Some studies find
that online and offline sales channels are indeed in the same market. The probability that a
consumer will purchase a computer online, for example, increases by more than 1% for every
1% increase in offline prices, suggesting that online prices may help keep offline prices lower
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than they would otherwise be.114 Similarly, legalization of direct wine shipping from out-of-state
businesses to Virginia consumers tended to reduce the spread between online and offline
prices.115 No empirical studies find that online sales have increased offline prices.
ii. Casket Prices
Anecdotal evidence suggests that online casket prices are often lower than bricks-and-mortar
prices. Third-party casket sellers typically charge significantly lower prices than funeral homes
for comparable caskets.116 Some independent vendors undercut established funeral home prices
by as much as 50%.117 One court found that funeral homes mark up their casket prices from 250400%, and sometimes as high as 600%, whereas online vendors mark up their caskets by
substantially less.118 In Casket Royale, the court concluded that, “as a result of this requirement,
consumers in Mississippi are offered fewer choices when it comes to selecting a casket . . . .
Ultimately, the consumer is harmed by this regulation as one is forced to pay higher prices in a
far less competitive environment.”119
Similarly, surveys imply that online casket sales have helped reduce bricks-and-mortar prices. In
a 2004 survey of funeral homes, 71% of those responding stated that they had reduced markups
on caskets in response to third-party sellers.120 In the same survey, 41% of respondents stated that
their average casket markup exceeded 200%, whereas two years ago, 68% of them had markups
higher than 200%.121 In Powers, the court found that “as long as independent sellers stay in the
market, casket sales from independent sources . . . place downward pressure on casket prices as a
result of increased competition. This downward pressure may result, and in other states has at
times resulted, in lower casket prices.”122 Finally, according to one economist, “Enough people
are now browsing for caskets [on the Internet] that an owner of a brick-and-mortar funeral home
told me that more and more people are coming to his funeral home with pictures (and prices) of
caskets they found on the Internet.” Even if customers feel that negotiating over prices is
114
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disrespectful to the deceased, “funeral directors see the prices and understand that they need to
respond to them.”123
Two recent economic studies have examined the effects of casket sales restrictions and the
potential for Internet casket sales to offer consumers lower prices. Yale University economists
Judith Chevalier and Fiona Scott Morton analyzed data from surveys of funeral directors’
Generalized Price Lists in six southern states. They found that a state requirement that casket
sellers must have funeral director’s license increases the price funeral homes charge for a plain,
cloth-covered wood casket by about $261. The potential Internet savings, however, are even
larger. Chevalier and Scott Morton’s regression analysis finds that funeral directors charge about
$1045 for a plain wood casket in restrictive states, but similar caskets are available on the
Internet for about $440. Even after accounting for the fact that funeral directors in non-restrictive
states charge higher prices for their services, the consumer in a non-restrictive state could still
save $344 on the cost of a funeral by buying the casket online.124 Funeral homes in restrictive
states also charge about $124 more for a cardboard box for cremation.125
Chevalier and Scott Morton also used 1997 Economic Census data from 49 states to test whether
funeral directors’ receipts per death for funeral merchandise are higher in restrictive states. They
found that in restrictive states, funeral directors had merchandise receipts per death that were
$175 higher than in non-restrictive states.126
Another study, conducted by an expert witness in the Powerscase, compared an online vendor’s
prices for 30 caskets with prices for the same caskets sold in 14 Oklahoma funeral homes. The
funeral homes’ prices averaged 68% higher than those of the Internet retailer. Funeral home
prices for the same casket varied significantly, with an average price spread of 52%.127 Thus, a
consumer who shopped several funeral homes could achieve significant savings, but a consumer
who shopped on the Internet could achieve even larger savings.
More recent empirical research thus confirms the anecdotal evidence cited in court cases:
consumers can save a significant amount of money on caskets by purchasing them on the
Internet. Moreover, competition from third-party casket sellers appears to have forced funeral
directors in non-restrictive states to lower their casket prices, although the funeral directors’
prices still appear to be far above the cost of a casket. Whether these price savings on caskets
translate into lower overall funeral costs is less clear.
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b. Funeral Prices
Economic theory suggests that online casket sales may or may not lower overall funeral costs.128
In response to competition from independent casket vendors, funeral directors may simply raise
prices for their other goods and services to compensate for lower casket prices, particularly if
they have market power based on factors besides their control of casket sales.129 This is, of
course, simply an application of the “one monopoly rent” theory associated with “Chicago
school” antitrust analysis.130
On the other hand, third-party casket sales could help reduce overall funeral prices if the demand
for caskets is less price elastic than the demand for other funeral goods and services. For
example, if a funeral director could more easily persuade consumers to buy a more expensive
casket than to spend additional money on a more elaborate service, then third party casket sales
constrain the funeral director’s ability to price discriminate. Likewise, if consumers are less
likely to perceive a high casket price as an excessive charge, then the funeral director has an
incentive to take more of his profit through high casket prices.131 This strategy is less likely to
succeed if consumers have access to caskets sold by third parties who lack market power from
regulatory barriers to entry.
One district court found both effects:
In some states where open price competition is occurring, the overall price of
funerals appears to be going down or escalating at a decreased rate. In some cases,
however, when competition increases, funeral homes have raised their prices for
the other services they provide in order to compensate for profits lost due to lower
casket prices.132
Similarly, at an FTC workshop on barriers to e-commerce, one panelist agreed that greater
competition for casket sales likely would lower funeral costs somewhat: “increasing competition
in casket markets will, however, probably reduce funeral expenditures, just not as much as some
people think.”133 According to that panelist, competitive casket markets will constrain how much
funeral directors can raise other prices, in part because consumers might search for better deals.
Once consumers learn that there are options to choose from among funeral arrangements, prices
will have to change to match the discriminating customer.134 Moreover, price competition would
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increase due to the development of referral systems between online casket vendors and funeral
homes.135 Some web sites already offer this type of service.
Two econometric studies have examined the effect of casket sales restrictions on total funeral
costs, with conflicting results.
Daniel Sutter analyzed Economic Census data from 1997 to determine whether 13 states that
required casket sellers to have funeral director’s licenses had higher funeral costs. The study
found that the restrictions’ effect depended on the difficulty of obtaining a funeral director’s
license. Funeral homes’ receipts per death were about $450 (11%) higher in states that required a
funeral director’s license and imposed the most extensive training requirements.136 Thus, the
licensing requirement raises consumers’ funeral costs when barriers to entry into funeral
directing are high, but not when barriers to entry are low. Receipts per death for the entire death
care industry (including cemeteries and crematories) were $132-826 (3-16%) higher in the states
than ban third-party casket sales and impose the most extensive training requirements on funeral
directors. This finding suggests that funeral directors benefit at the expense of both consumers
and other death care providers, such as cemeteries and crematories.137 Casket sales restrictions
also increase the number of funeral homes per capita and funeral home employees per death in
states with the most stringent licensing requirements, which suggests that the restrictions tend to
protect smaller, less efficient funeral homes.138
Chevalier and Scott Morton reached a different conclusion examining similar 1997 Economic
Census data. They found that in restrictive states, funeral directors had higher receipts per death
for merchandise, but this effect was roughly balanced by lower receipts per death for funeral
directors’ services. The authors conclude that, after the FTC’s 1984 Funeral Rule made it easier
for consumers to purchase funeral goods from third parties, “funeral directors moved rents out of
funeral goods and into funeral services, except in states which adopt funeral good sales
restrictions.”139 Employing 2002 Economic Census data, they found that funeral directors’ total
receipts per death were unaffected when several states removed their licensing requirement for
casket sales in response to court challenges.140
The different findings in the Sutter and Chevalier/Scott Morton studies may be a result of
different control variables and econometric specifications. Sutter controls for the severity of the
states’ barriers to entry into funeral directing, finding that the licensing requirement for casket
sellers increases receipts per death only in states that impose the most extensive training
requirement on funeral directors. Casket sales restrictions have a disproportionate impact in
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states with higher barriers to entry into funeral directing. In states with low barriers to entry,
competition among licensed funeral directors may suffice to keep prices near costs—and
entrepreneurs who really just want to sell caskets can easily obtain a funeral director’s license.
Chevalier and Scott Morton do not control for the difficulty of obtaining a funeral director’s
license, but they do control for the cremation rate and each state’s historic pattern of funeral
spending. A definitive answer awaits future research. In the meantime, Sutter’s findings should
give policymakers and courts reason to question state laws that require casket sellers to have
funeral directors’ licenses.
c. Variety
Aside from lower prices, online casket sales also offer consumers a greater variety of caskets.
When consumer tastes are heterogeneous, increased variety makes consumers better off,
“especially . . . when the additional customization or versioning can be produced at very low or
zero marginal costs.”141
Consumers can purchase individualized caskets with non-standard interior linings, such as fur or
leather, or particular themes, such as western or Victorian themes.142 They also can purchase
caskets with humorous themes; one casket is emblazoned with the words “Return to Sender.”143
Consumers may not find such caskets through funeral homes, which may have only a certain
number of samples available to show. Although it is difficult to quantify the benefits of product
variety in this market, at least some consumers appear to highly value the ability to personalize
their loved ones’ caskets. One consumer, for instance, spent several hundred dollars having his
father’s casket painted with the colors of his father’s favorite university.144 Other consumers may
have religious reasons for wanting a certain style of casket. Accordingly, while the extent of
competition’s effect on price is not clear, competition certainly increases consumer choice.
d. Other Effects
The Internet offers consumers a variety of intangible benefits. Some consumers may prefer the
privacy of shopping for a casket online.145 Some consumers may feel less pressure from
salespeople by shopping for a casket over the Internet.146 Finally, as in many industries,
consumers may prefer the convenience of shopping online. For both pre-need and at-need sales,
consumers can search the Internet twenty-four hours a day from the convenience of their
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homes.147 Similarly, online sales could lower consumers’ “coordination costs” by allowing family
members in different parts of the country to select a casket jointly.
In short, competition from independent, online casket sellers offers consumers significant
benefits. Licensing regulations can impair this competition directly, by keeping independent
casket sellers out of the market, or indirectly, by creating market conditions conducive to cartels
or exclusionary behavior by bricks-and-mortar funeral directors. Thus, licensing can create
significant costs for consumers.
2. Assessing the Consumer Protection Rationale
Although we have limited empirical information about the impact of state licensing on
competition in the casket market, the impact on consumer protection is more certain. There is
little or no evidence that these requirements benefit casket purchasers rather than the funeral
directors.148 For three reasons, state licensing of independent casket sellers is unlikely to benefit
casket purchasers. First, many consumers are not as vulnerable or uninformed as the advocates of
regulation assume.149 Indeed, a consumer savvy enough to try and purchase a casket from
someone other than his or her funeral director is likely to be relatively well-informed. Second, to
the extent that some consumers are vulnerable or uninformed, more stringent state licensing
likely compounds the problem. Stringent licensing raises barriers to entry, reduces competition,
and makes it easier for funeral directors to employ aggressive sales practices.150 Third, most
licensing requirements have little relation to the business of selling caskets. Even if licensing
funeral directors provides some consumer protection or public health benefits, licensing
independent casket retailers provides no analogous benefits. Accordingly, the empirical evidence
deeply undermines the argument that state licensing of casket retailers promotes a legitimate
state interest.
a. Sales Pressure
Some states and funeral homes argue that grieving consumers need protection from aggressive
sales tactics. They contend that consumers may lack the ability to comparison shop or resist sales
pressure. In Powers, for instance, the district court found that “at least in some instances,
Oklahoma funeral homes have employed sharp practices in their dealings with consumers
purchasing caskets.”151
147

See Tahmincioglu, supra note __.

148

See Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abrogation and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 Chap. L. Rev. 173, 179 (2003)
(“Laws restricting casket sales to licensed funeral directors are a more recent phenomenon, but their benefit to
funeral directors is clear. Casket sales are extremely lucrative for funeral directors”).
149

Fred S. McChesney, Consumer Ignorance and Consumer Protection Law: Empirical Evidence from the FTC
Funeral Rule, 7 J. L. & POL. 1 (1990).
150

See, e.g., David Harrington and Kathy Krynski, The Effect of State Funeral Regulations on Cremation Rates:
Testing For Demand Inducement in Funeral Markets, 45 J. L. & Econ. 205 (2002).

151

Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *4. See also Sklar, Tr. 501 -02.

26

The best empirical evidence, however, suggests that many consumers can and do make rational
funeral purchasing decisions.152 Consumers often benefit from prior experience when making
choices regarding funerals. For example, an FTC staff survey found that over 60% of
respondents had been involved in at least one prior funeral arrangement.153 Moreover, only 11%
of respondents arranged funerals alone; many first-time consumers receive help from friends and
relatives.154 In addition, because the majority of deaths are not unexpected or sudden, consumers
can gather information and arrange funerals deliberately and in advance.155 Experience,
reputation, and referrals are important ways that consumers gather information about individual
funeral directors.156 Funeral directors’ trade associations even survey consumers to gauge their
satisfaction with prices and relay consumer feedback to individual funeral homes.157 Moreover,
consumers purchase many goods and services at the time of a funeral from non-funeral directors,
such as airline tickets and flowers, with no reported problems.158
One of the most significant tests of the “ignorant consumer” hypotheses lies in a comprehensive
assessment of the effects of the FTC’s Funeral Rule. The Funeral Rule essentially requires that
funeral directors disclose itemized price lists and provide a final statement of goods and services.
The Rule also requires that funeral directors refrain from various types of misrepresentations,
from requiring the purchase of certain goods and services as a condition for receiving other
goods and services, and from embalming for a fee without prior approval.159 The FTC enacted the
rule to protect ignorant and harried consumers from exploitation by aggressive and
knowledgeable funeral directors. Yet by most measures, the rule led to little change in consumer
shopping or purchasing behavior.160 In fact, the rule appears to have increased consumer
spending on funerals—a result difficult to square with the notion that, prior to the rule, funeral
directors were selling consumers unwanted merchandise.161 The rule generated no increase in
consumer satisfaction, which surveys showed already exceeded 90% prior to the rule’s
enactment.162
Finally, the fact that some licensed funeral homes may engage in aggressive sales tactics does
not support licensing requirements for independent casket sellers. Arguments for regulation of
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funeral directors assume that funeral purchasers are “ignorant, beleaguered, and dissatisfied.”163
They must make unexpected and rapid decisions with little information about competitive
alternatives. The funeral director, as a trained, informed professional, may manipulate the
customer’s emotions to sell things that customers would not purchase when in a calmer state of
mind, or may selectively disclose only the more expensive options, including caskets.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, they are basically irrelevant for independent casket
sales, and especially irrelevant for online sales. Requiring independent retailers to have funeral
directors’ licenses will protect few grief-stricken consumers. These consumers are the ones who
are usually assumed to deal only with the funeral director who provides the funeral services and
thus eschew comparison shopping at independent casket retailers.164 Licensing requirements for
independent casket retailers could, however, reduce the flow of useful information to consumers
who do want to shop around. Independent casket sellers provide consumers with an additional
set of competitive options and an alternative source of information. Online casket vendors allow
consumers to search available models and compare prices without having to interact with sales
staff at all. Regulations that increase barriers to independent casket sales tend to deprive
consumers of this alternative information source and increase consumer vulnerability to
manipulation.
In Powers, the Federal Trade Commission argued precisely this point in refuting a particularly
novel consumer protection theory. Oklahoma argued that casket sellers must have funeral
director’s licenses to ensure that casket purchasers are protected by the FTC’s Funeral Rule.165
The Funeral Rule applies only to businesses that supply both funeral goods and funeral services,
which is precisely what funeral directors do. Former FTC officials have questioned whether the
rule was really justified by funeral market conditions.166 Regardless of the merits of the rule, as
the FTC itself pointed out in an amicus brief, requiring independent casket sellers to have funeral
director’s licenses does not further the goals of the Funeral Rule:
The fundamental purpose of the Rule is to protect consumers by giving them full
information in order to promote greater competition. In adopting the Rule, the
Commission determined that, without adequate information, consumers could find
themselves at the mercy of individual funeral directors, who, in turn, would be
insulated from meaningful competition. The Rule sought to remedy that problem
by helping to ensure that funeral directors faced genuine competition, to the
ultimate benefit of consumers.
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The purpose and effect of the challenged portion of the FSLA [Funeral Services
Licensing Act] is precisely the opposite. Rather than promote competition, the
FSLA prohibits it. Rather than protect consumers by exposing funeral directors to
meaningful competition, the FSLA protects funeral directors from facing any
competition from third-party casket sellers. Rather than promote consumer
choice, the FSLA forces consumers to purchase caskets from funeral directors.
Whatever ends the FSLA can be said to be advancing, it is not advancing the ends
of the FTC’s Funeral Rule.167
Indeed, it is likely that Oklahoma’s licensing requirement would not even have subjected
independent casket sellers to the Funeral Rule, since the rule explicitly applies only to “funeral
providers” who furnish both “funeral goods and funeral services.”168 Even if the Funeral Rule
produces consumer benefits, therefore, licensing casket sellers would not produce any benefits
due to the Funeral Rule.
b. Grief Counseling
Some states and funeral homes have expressed concerns about the mental health of consumers
buying caskets online. They argue that funeral directors are trained to comfort people during a
time of loss. Mirroring arguments in other industries, funeral homes contend that “a casket is not
just a commodity like a shirt or a pair of shoes; it is a product for a special specific event at a
very sensitive and specific time.”169 In addition, some grief counselors believe that consumers
should visit funeral homes to ease the grieving process,170 and others worry that online sales
might “trivialize the gravity of death.”171 A Maryland regulator testified that the “difficulty with
an Internet sale is that we may not have the opportunity for this give and take and personal
exchange.”172
Online sales, however, simply give consumers a choice of where to buy a casket. Even in states
that allow online sales, most consumers continue to purchase caskets through funeral directors.
Furthermore, consumers can receive psychological help from people other than licensed funeral
directors; in the Tennessee case, one of the unlicensed funeral vendors was an ordained
minister.173 Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted two other problems with this argument:
[E]ven those who purchase from casket retailers will still need a licensed funeral
director for arranging services and handling the body, at which time the survivors
may still receive the benefit of the funeral director’s psychological training.
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Moreover, survivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make funeral
arrangements, from churches to food vendors for a wake, none of whom is
required to have this psychological training. This justification is very weak,
indeed.174
c. Health and Safety
Some states and funeral homes contend that licensing promotes health and safety, because proper
disposal of human remains affects the environment and the public.175
The evidence, however, shows that caskets themselves do not protect consumers. “Caskets have
not been shown to play a role in protecting public health, safety, or sanitation, nor have they been
shown to aid in protection of the environment.”176 In Craigmiles, the district court found that “the
record contains no evidence that anyone has ever been harmed by a leaky casket.”177 Many states
do not require the use of a casket in a burial at all; in both Oklahoma and Tennessee, for
example, consumers can provide their own casket, or none at all.178 Similarly, Georgia sets no
standards for the design or construction of caskets.179 At the FTC workshop, no one presented
evidence demonstrating a link between public health and caskets, or evidence that consumers
suffered harm in states that did not require a license to sell a casket.
In any case, even if caskets did benefit the environment, a casket retailer would not need
specialized training to sell them. “Selling a casket is not rocket science. You don’t need to be a
funeral director, to be educated at a mortuary school to do these things.”180 None of the federal
courts that considered the issue found that selling a casket required specialized training. The
court in the Oklahoma case, for example, concluded that “very little specialized knowledge is
required to sell caskets.”181 Currently, “none of the training received by licensed funeral directors
regarding caskets has anything to do with public health or safety.”182 Less than 5% of the
education and training requirements for a license relate to selling a casket.183
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In terms of logistics, independent casket retailers can provide caskets in a timely manner.
Independent casket retailers face the same types of shipping and inventory issues as funerals.
The fact that a casket comes from an independent seller “does not present any unique problems
for funeral directors or for customers.”184 In Casket Royale, the court found that “Defendants
have failed to show that the licensing requirement in any way speeds the process of burial. More
importantly, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence that unlicensed dealers slow burial
or cremation.”185
Finally, there is no difference in quality between caskets sold by independent vendors and those
sold by funeral directors.186 For most caskets, the manufacturer, not the retailer, provides a
warranty, which will seldom if ever address the protective qualities of the caskets.187 A casket is a
“glorified box” that “does not differ from any other product in the marketplace.”188 In
Craigmiles, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “there is no evidence in the record that licensed
funeral directors were selling caskets that were systematically more protective than those sold by
independent casket retailers. Indeed, the only difference between the caskets is that those sold by
licensed funeral directors were systematically more expensive.”189 Of course, if there was a
difference in casket quality, a state could simply regulate the casket directly, with far fewer
anticompetitive effects.
d. Legal Remedies
Some funeral homes and states maintain that consumers could suffer from fraud or other abuses
if they buy caskets from independent sources. They suggest that injured consumers would have
no legal remedy unless casket sales are limited to funeral directors subject to regulatory
oversight.
Like any retailers, however, casket sellers are subject to the same general consumer protection
laws as any other business, including state contract and consumer protection laws.190 Many of
these laws provide for private rights of action.191 At the FTC’s workshop, for example, no one
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presented evidence indicating that these laws do not provide sufficient remedies for consumers,
or that jurisdictional concerns present any greater difficulties in this market than in any other.192
3. Less Restrictive Alternatives
To the extent that states seek to protect consumers, they may have less restrictive means than
licensing of achieving their consumer protection goals. In the first place, states could best protect
consumers by encouraging competition. As Craigmiles found, competition, not regulation,
represents the best remedy for practices that raise consumer protection concerns: “perhaps the
best antidote for the evil of funeral goods and services bundling by funeral homes is to have
third-party competitors on individual items like caskets.”193 Online sales allow consumers to
comparison shop among a much larger number of casket providers. Through the Internet,
consumers can avoid having to interact with salespeople in purchasing a casket altogether, and
the empirical evidence indicates that online sales put competitive pressure on funeral homes. By
easing licensing requirements, states would encourage competition and, therefore, increase
consumer protection.
Greater competition also would improve the overall quality of caskets purchased by consumers.
By lowering prices, competition would allow consumers to purchase better caskets. The Sixth
Circuit explained the effect concisely:
In fact, restricting sales of caskets to licensed funeral directors would seem to
have an adverse effect on the quality of caskets. The licensing requirement does
not require consumers to choose more protective caskets or funeral directors to
recommend them. Generally, however, the cost of more protective caskets is
higher. If casket retailers were to increase competition on casket prices and bring
those prices closer to marginal costs, then more protective caskets would become
more affordable for consumers with limited funds and their use would likely
increase.194
The FTC staff offered a similar analysis in the contact lens industry. Staff testimony before the
Connecticut Board of Examiners for Opticians noted that higher prices for disposable contact
lenses likely lead consumers to replace them less frequently than their doctors recommend.195
192

Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission has authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to bring an enforcement
action against a casket seller who makes false or misleading claims about the products or services it provides. 15
U.S.C. § 45. The Commission also has authority under its unfairness jurisdiction to stop marketing practices that
cause or are likely to cause substantial consumer injury, which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers and is not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). See also Unfairness
Policy Statement, appended to International Harvester Co., 104 FTC 949, 1070 (1984). Many state attorneys
general have similar authority.

193

Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228.

194

Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226.

195

See FTC Staff Comment Before the Connecticut Board of Examiners for Opticians (Mar. 27, 2002), at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020007.htm.

32

In terms of regulation, states can tailor laws to address a specific consumer protection concern.
For example, Mississippi justified its licensing regime as a way to prevent funeral directors from
soliciting dead bodies,196 but Mississippi could have simply applied its solicitation rule to all
casket vendors. Likewise, if a state found, hypothetically, that the evidence demonstrated a
concern about the quality of caskets, states could simply establish standards for casket usage and
quality rather than limit the types of vendors who could sell caskets.197
Finally, if states choose to require a license to sell a casket, they can lower the cost of obtaining
one, or require simple registration. For example, states need not require training in embalming,
which has no relation to the business of selling a casket. Some states impose relatively simple
requirements to obtaining a license. California requires only that a licensee pass a test, but does
not impose specific educational or apprenticeship standards.198 According to a Maryland
regulator, Maryland’s licensing system is “more of a registration. There’s no training or
education requirements, and the permit applications for businesses are rarely unmet . . . Our
barrier is that they have to be in business and above 21 in age and not be on parole, and they’re
in. So, that doesn’t keep too many people out.”199 Maryland also gives out-of-state internet
vendors the option to voluntarily submit to the state’s jurisdiction, which some vendors accept to
instill confidence in potential customers.200

IV.

Conclusion

Both the case law and the empirical evidence undermine the argument that state funeral
licensing, as applied to online casket sales, furthers a legitimate state interest. Powers
notwithstanding, naked protectionism is not a legitimate state interest. No other court has so
held. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that the regulations likely harm consumers by
raising casket prices and restricting the variety of available caskets.
In light of Granholm and the casket cases, courts may increasingly scrutinize regulations that
impair the flow of e-commerce, not only in caskets and wine, but in many other industries
ranging from automobiles to real estate. The Granholm court extensively analyzed the effects of
discriminatory regulation on interstate commerce, consumer welfare, and the underlying
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consumer protection rationales. When state regulation clearly impedes e-commerce—even
ostensibly intrastate commerce—courts may well find that the regulation also impedes interstate
commerce. If so, they would then need to use empirical evidence to evaluate the state’s
justifications.
The empirical evidence shows that licensing third party casket retailers increases casket prices,
may increase overall funeral expenditures (when barrier to entry into funeral directing are high),
and likely deprives consumers of the increased variety and convenience that online casket sales
offer. In addition, there is little evidence that licensing is necessary to accomplish any legitimate
public purpose. Many funeral purchasers are well-informed consumers who are unlikely to need
the protections that licensing purports to offer. Licensing third-party casket sellers offers
consumers little additional protection, since most of the consumers likely to shop from third
party vendors are likely to be well-informed. Discouraging market entry by online casket sellers
could actually reduce consumer protections by depriving consumers of useful information they
can garner from online sellers. Online casket sales do not deprive consumers of access to grief
counseling, since casket buyers must still deal with trained funeral directors and often other
professionals, such as clergy, to obtain funeral services. Licensing of casket retailers does
nothing to improve public health or safety. Finally, states can use less restrictive alternatives,
such as registration, to accomplish the legitimate public purposes that licensing is purported to
accomplish.
For these reasons, state funeral regulations which impede electronic commerce in caskets would
almost certainly fail a Granholm-style factual analysis. This implies that such regulations could
be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. They would also likely fail a challenge
under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause if courts consider whether evidence actually
supports the state’s defense. Accordingly, Granholm may ultimately drive the last nail into the
coffin of casket sales licensing.
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